30 Firstly, as regards the visual comparison, the signs at issue differ not only because of the presence of figurative elements in the sign applied for – white letters in a green oval, all on a rectangular yellow background – but also because of their word elements. Even though the word elements of the marks at issue have three letters out of six in common, a difference arises from the fact that the earlier marks begin with the letters ‘ka’ and the mark applied for with the letters ‘co’ and the fact that the consumer normally attaches more importance to the first part of words (Joined Cases T 183/02 and T 184/02 El Corte Inglés v OHIM – González Cabello and Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España (MUNDICOR)  ECR II 965, paragraph 81).
31 The applicant’s argument that the figurative elements of the mark applied for are banal and ordinary cannot be accepted. In the figurative mark applied for, the word element is surrounded by an oval which is in turn surrounded by a rectangle, a feature which in itself distinguishes that mark from the earlier marks, which are all solely word marks, even if the difference between the word elements set out in paragraph 30 above are not taken into account.
32 Secondly, as regards the phonetic comparison, it should be noted that the beginnings of the signs at issue are pronounced differently in that the earlier marks begin with the syllable ‘ka’ and the mark applied for with the syllable ‘co’. The second syllables of those signs differ because of their component vowels, since the syllable ‘ru’ is pronounced with a longer sound than the syllable ‘ro’ in Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian. However, because of the fact that the last syllable ‘na’ is the same in those signs, as is the sequence of similar consonants, there is a low phonetic similarity between the signs taken as a whole (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 September 2009 in Case T 458/07 Dominio de la Vega v OHIM – Ambrosio Velasco (DOMINIO DE LA VEGA), not published in the ECR, paragraph 42).
33 Thirdly, as regards the conceptual comparison, it should be noted that, as is apparent from paragraph 21 of the contested decision, the word ‘corona’, meaning ‘crown’ in Spanish, does not have any meaning in Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian. Accordingly, no conceptual comparison is possible between the signs at issue in the three Baltic States. The mere fact that the Lithuanian word ‘karūna’ means ‘crown’ is not sufficient to establish that the relevant public associates the terms ‘karuna’ or ‘karūna’ with the word ‘corona’, which remains a foreign word.
34 That finding cannot be weakened by the applicant’s argument that the fact that the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian public have a good level of Russian is a matter of common knowledge and that, consequently, the Russian word ‘корона’, transcribed into the Latin alphabet as ‘korona’, and meaning ‘crown’, is directly associated with the mark applied for CORONA as well as with the earlier marks KARUNA and KARŪNA.
35 In that connection, it must be held that, even if the relevant public know that the Russian word ‘корона’ means ‘crown’, there is no evidence to show that the relevant public will associate ‘корона’ in the Cyrillic alphabet – or ‘korona’, the equivalent term in the Latin alphabet – with the word element ‘corona’ of the sign applied for, which is a foreign word without meaning in Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian.
41 In the present case, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 22 of the contested decision, that, despite the identical nature of the goods at issue, the differences between the signs at issue are such as to prevent the relevant consumers from mistaking the commercial origin of those goods. Furthermore, the fact that chocolate is not ordered verbally, but merely selected from shop shelves by consumers, makes the visual aspect of those signs more relevant. In that regard, it should be pointed out that the level of attention of the relevant public to be taken into account for assessing the likelihood of confusion in relation to everyday consumption is neither particularly high nor particularly low (see paragraph 23 above).
42 It follows from the foregoing considerations that one of the cumulative conditions for the application of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 is not fulfilled. In view of the lack of similarity between the marks at issue, there is no need to undertake a global assessment of the likelihood of confusion (see paragraph 40 above) or to examine the applicant’s other arguments concerning that assessment.
43 Given all those factors, the differences between the signs at issue are such as to exclude the possibility that the relevant public may believe that the goods at issue come from the same undertaking or from economically-linked undertakings. In the present case, the applicant is wrong to rely on case-law according to which marks with a highly distinctive character, whether per se or because of the reputation they possess on the market, enjoy broader protection than marks with a less distinctive character (Case C 251/95 SABEL  ECR I 6191, paragraph 24). The Board of Appeal was therefore right to consider that there was no likelihood of confusion between the signs at issue.